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“Globalization and the Theory of International Law” 
Frank J. Garcia* 
Boston College Law School 
I. Intro 
 Contemporary globalization both requires, and permits, the re-casting of 
international law away from a “society of states” model and towards a model of global 
society and even global community.  By effectively eliminating both time and space as 
factors in social interaction, globalization is changing the nature of global social relations, 
intensifying the obsolescence of the “society of states” model, and demanding a 
fundamental change in the social theory of international law towards a global society of 
persons.  Because of these changes, globalization requires that we re-cast international 
law into a global public law, and expand the domain of justice from the domestic into the 
global, as the fundamental normative criterion for international law.  Through a profound 
re-examination of core international legal doctrines and institutions such as boundaries, 
sovereignty, legitimacy, citizenship, and the territorial control of resources, the 
international law of a society of states can be re-fashioned into the global public law of a 
global society.   
II. From States to Persons: Re-conceptualizing Global Legal Regulation 
 The dominant contemporary account of the social basis of international law has 
been the “society of states” model.1 In this view, to the extent that international law 
                                                 
*  This essay is drawn from a larger work-in-progress delivered as a working paper at MIT, Brandeis, and 
Boston College.  The author would like to thank those audiences for their helpful input, and Mark Toews 
for his able research assistance.  This essay was prepared with the support of the Boston College Law 
School Fr. Francis Nicholson Fund.    
 
1 See generally CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 67-123 (1979) 
(overview of the society of states model of international relations, superseding earlier Realist paradigm). 
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constructs an ordered social space (a claim which has been contested since Hobbes if not 
before), it is a social space in which states are the subjects.  In other words, international 
law exists to order a community in which states are the members.  
 This view of international law as regulating a society of states has two important 
normative implications, both flowing from the core analogy of states to persons 
underlying the model.  First, it asserts a strong view of state autonomy: like persons in 
domestic society, states in international society are viewed as autonomous sources of 
moral ends, immune from external interference.2 Second, there is no principle of 
distributive justice to which states are subject; they are presumed to be entitled to the 
resources they control.3 Taken together, this approach can be called the “morality of 
states” model of international justice.4 
 We can see this approach played out doctrinally in many key areas.  For example, 
the core doctrines of non-intervention, self-determination and state responsibility treat the 
state as the primary locus of autonomy, self-realization, and rights, and are framed largely 
in view of the interests and needs of territorial states.  International harms to individuals 
are understood within a framework of harm to a state’s rights.  In all cases, the analogy 
between states and persons controls, and it is the state’s liberty and rights which are 
defined as primary subjects of the law.5   
                                                 
2 Beitz, supra note 1 at 65-66. 
3 Beitz has analogized this to 19th century liberalism at the international level: “a belief in the liberty of 
individual agents, with an indifference to the distributive outcomes of their economic interaction.” Id. 
4 Id. 
5 To cite just one example of the doctrinal pre-eminence of this view, the society of states model underlies 
the entire approach to international law taken in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. The 
Restatement asserts that “international law is the law of the international community of states,” and “states 
are the principal persons in international law.” All other entities with any personality (international 
organizations and natural persons themselves) derive their personhood, and the extent of their legal rights 
in international law, from grants flowing from the primary persons: states. Restatement p. 16-17, 70-1. 
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 Pressure to shift away from this model began in earnest in the mid-20th century, 
through human rights, international economic law, and the emergence of international 
civil society, all of which render the “society of states” model increasingly deficient both 
empirically and normatively. Criticisms of current international law and institutions point 
to the lack of democratic participation and legitimacy, lack of distributive justice, lack of 
basic welfare rights and security, etc. – the usual suspects in conferences and symposia 
such as this one.  From a theoretical viewpoint, I would argue that these are not problems 
in the “society of states” model - instead, they point to the limits of this model, signaling 
that we have reached those limits.  What is the next step?   
III Globalization, Global Society and Global Community  
 Efforts to reconfigure international law at the theoretical level often center around 
the fundamental moral status of individual persons, drawing on the work of Kant and 
others, and going by the name “cosmopolitanism.”6  Such efforts, however, run into a 
variety of theoretical problems, including important communitarian objections to the 
possibility of global justice, on the ground that justice is a virtue within political 
communities, not between them.7 This objection fits well with the “society of states” 
model, and helps keep justice out of international law.   
 However, by effectively eliminating both time and space as factors in social 
interaction,8 globalization is changing the nature of global social relations, and creating 
the basis for both society and community at the global level.  Viewed from the 
                                                 
6 See generally Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the State System,” in POLITICAL 
RESTRUCTURING IN EUROPE (BROWN ED. 1994) (surveying contemporary cosmopolitanism).  
7 See generally DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (1995), MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) 
(raising general communitarian objections to global justice). 
8 For a comprehensive overview of globalization as a phenomenon, emphasizing changes in the perception 
of time and space, see Heba Shams, “Law in the Context of ‘Globalisation:’ A Framework of Analysis,” 35 
INT’L LAWYER 1589 (2001). 
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perspective of political theory, globalization is lifting relationships out of the strictly 
territorial into the “global” or meta-territorial.9  The political and legal significance of this 
change is immediate and fundamental: as the space in which we conduct our social 
relations changes, our manner of regulating those relations must change as well.  To be 
effective, regulatory decisions must increasingly involve the meta-state level.  
Globalization thus requires a fundamental re-examination of social regulation and 
governance at the global level, leading to a system in which states may still have a 
preeminent role, but not the only role.10   
 For our purpose here, we need to understand how globalization is changing the 
nature of social relations, at the national and at the “global” levels, and paving the way 
for global community, and for global justice, even on stringent communitarian terms.11  
This change has a fundamental impact on the possibilities open to international law.    
 First, globalization is bringing about at the global level the conditions which make 
justice both possible, and necessary, at the domestic level, which Rawls calls the 
circumstances of justice.12 Rawls lists five circumstances: a moderate scarcity of 
resources, a shared geographical territory, a capacity to help or harm each other, and, 
subjectively, that people are both non-altruistic, and hold conflicting claims.13 
 The key point is that globalization is bringing about the same circumstances of 
justice at the global level, which Rawls described at the domestic level.  To begin with, 
                                                 
9 Id.; see generally GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS (HELD, ET AL. EDS 1999) (reviewing evolution of meta-
state institutions). 
10 See, e.g., ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF 
THE NETWORK SOCIETY (1996). 
11 My treatment here draws on a fuller exposition of these issues, in “Globalization, Global Community, 
and the Possibility of Global Justice,” available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=661564. 
12 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 126-130 (1971) (overview of circumstances of justice). 
13 Id. 
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there is of course the same basic scarcity of  resources at the global level.  Through 
globalization, people are increasingly competing for the same resources on a global scale 
in a shared territory: our planet.  That they are non-altruistic and assert conflicting claims 
over these resources does not need to be argued. 
 Because of globalization, we also now have the capacity to help and to harm each 
other at the global level as well, to an unprecedented degree.  Through globalization, we 
increasingly find that we have a capacity to effectively respond to the needs and concerns 
of others beyond our boundaries, through the transnational mobilization of information, 
power, capital, or public opinion.14 Because of globalization, we also increasingly find 
that our state’s policies, and our own political and consumer choices, are influencing the 
life prospects of others in direct and dramatic ways.  The globalization of markets means 
that in many cases we are directly profiting from the economic and social conditions in 
other parts of the world.  Thus, completing Rawls’ basic conditions, we have the capacity 
to harm each other as well.   
 Together, these global circumstances of justice offer one kind of argument for 
global society, making justice both possible and necessary at the global level.  A second, 
more ambitious argument is that globalization is going farther than creating merely global 
society, and is creating global community, at least to a limited degree.   
 One basis for global community is the globalization of knowledge.  Through 
globalization, we know so much more, immediately and intimately, about the plight of  
people in other parts of the world.  One specific type of shared knowledge important to 
                                                 
14 CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUSTICE 9 (1999).  Even David Miller, a communitarian critic of global justice, 
acknowledges that the “prosaic observation that the rich countries now have the technical capacity to 
transfer large quantities of resources to the poorer countries,” makes a prima facie case that such transfers 
have become morally obligatory.  “The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice,” in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 164 
(MAPEL AND NARDIN EDS. 1998). 
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globalization is the growing recognition of the risks we share as human beings on this 
planet, and our shared interest in addressing those risks.  In this sense, globalization is 
creating what has been called a “community of risk.”15 
 Such knowledge satisfies a basic requirement for community – that we have the 
capacity to know another’s needs, concerns and preferences.  This kind of knowledge is 
the basis for creating solidarity, that leap of the moral imagination which says that your 
concerns are my concerns.    
 This community of knowledge and risk is also, increasingly, becoming a 
community of shared traditions, practices and understandings.  These grow, both 
spontaneously and institutionally, out of our perception of shared needs and interests, of 
our capacity to help and to harm, and our awareness of each other’s plight – in short, our 
understanding of globalization as interlocking our fates.  Despite the reality of conflict 
over social practices and values, we are increasingly a part of many sorts of global social 
networks.16 Moreover, commentators suggest that at least at the political level, there is an 
emerging consensus, or shared understanding, around the importance of markets, 
democracy and human rights.17   
 I would like to focus on two particular aspects of contemporary globalization, 
markets and meta-state institutions, as particularly indicative of the emergence of global 
community, at least in their respective realms. 
                                                 
15 Dirk Messner, “World Society – Structures and Trends,” in GLOBAL TRENDS & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
24 (KENNEDY, ET AL. EDS. 2002). 
16 Examples include multi-national corporations, NGO’s and various organs of international scientific 
cooperation.  
17 This consensus can be seen at the level of positive international law, and also normatively, insofar as the 
world’s leading religious and philosophical traditions can be said to converge around this triad.  David R. 
Mapel, “Justice Diversity and Law in International Society,” in Mapel and Nardin, supra note 14 at 247. 
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 To the extent that globalization is creating a global market society, this in itself 
constitutes a set of shared practices, and contributes to a community of shared interests. 
For example, market society has certain attributes – the  need for bureaucratic regulation, 
recognition of private property, civil courts, to name a few – which by virtue of their 
pronounced spill-over effects contribute to shared interests among participants.18 Not the 
least of these is an interest in considering institutions which supplement and mitigate the 
rigors of capitalism, compensating the “losers” through some form of wealth transfer.    
 Perhaps the strongest force for, and evidence of, an emerging global community 
involves our shared need to look to institutions beyond the state in order to frame an 
adequate social response to many of the problems and challenges we face.  Social 
allocation today is increasingly conducted through a complex partnership, consisting of 
states and their constituent units; international organizations; and non-state actors - all 
regulated or established through international law, and forming a “global basic structure” 
in Rawlsian terms.19   
 This shift towards the meta-state level has profound consequences for global 
community.  First, this shift indicates that national communities of justice are no longer 
self-sufficient.  From a distributive perspective, globalization is revealing domestic 
society to be an incomplete community, incapable of securing the overall well-being of 
its members by itself, and requiring a higher level of community – the global - to secure 
                                                 
18 See e.g. DON SLATER AND FRAN TONKISS, MARKET SOCIETY  92-116 (2001) (surveying range of 
institutions which markets require/are embedded in). 
19 “The institutions and quasi-formal arrangements affecting persons’ life prospects throughout the world 
are increasingly international ones – IFI’s, MNC’s, the G-8, the WTO….”  Jones, supra note 8 at 8.  Jones 
also argues that the traditional Rawlsian view, limiting justice to domestic society, “fails to assess the moral 
character of those institutions.” Id.. 
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this well-being.20 Second, this shift signals the emergence of global polities.  The role 
played by common institutions sharing a common language in building polities out of 
disparate peoples, has long been recognized in domestic politics as “nation-building.” 
Similarly, our growing tendency to look to meta-state institutions for responses to global 
social and environmental problems constitutes a shared understanding that such 
institutions will increasingly formulate or channel social policy decisions and orchestrate 
social welfare responses, and that few states can act without them on any important social 
issue.21 
 I am not suggesting that at this point in our history global social relations in toto 
form the sort of full-blown political community which communitarians point to in 
domestic social relations as their exemplar.  In my view, however, globalization is 
creating a third alternative: global society understood as containing “limited” degrees of 
community in specific functional areas.22 If we disaggregate the notion of community, we 
can see that globalization is creating certain elements of  community at the global level, 
such as knowledge of inter-connectedness and the circumstances of the other; and 
creating true community in certain areas of global social relations, such as humanitarian 
                                                 
20 Walzer describes the political community of justice as one “capable of arranging [its] own patterns of 
division and exchange, justly or unjustly.”  Supra note 7 at 31.  When a community is no longer capable of 
fixing its own patterns of division and exchange, it is no longer sufficient to analyze the justice of that 
community with sole reference to itself.  In other words, unable to fix its own distributions entirely itself, it 
is not capable of delivering its own justice.  We must therefore look to that further level of institutions 
which is affecting that community’s distributions – the global; and to its justice – global justice. 
21 Indeed, the many anti-globalization protests focused on Bretton Woods institutions indicate a growing 
awareness both that these institutions increasingly constrain allocative decision-making at the national 
level, and that they themselves engage (through the allocation of trade benefits, critical currencies and 
development aid, for example) in positive distributive functions; thus the anti-globalization movement 
represents the formation of a transboundary polity organized around meta-state institutions, albeit in a 
critical role. 
22 Moreover, the trend is towards increasing community.  Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus list Rwanda 
and Somalia as examples of a weak solidarity which can suggest that the concept of global community is 
either half-full, or half-empty.  They decide it is half-full, asking “After all, who would have cared - and 
how - a hundred years ago.” “The ‘International Community:’ Facing the Challenge of Globalization,” 9 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 266, 276 (1998). 
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relief and transboundary economic relations, by establishing that degree of social bond 
necessary to support justice.  This means that global society taken as a whole may not 
rise in all cases to the level of community which communitarians posit, but has enough 
elements of community, and contains enough pockets of community, to support an 
inquiry into justice in at least in some areas of global social relations.  
IV Global Public Law 
 If global community is emerging, at least in a limited form, then we need a global 
public law to structure it.23 This is the transformative challenge for international law and 
legal theory today: to move from the public law of inter-state relations, to the public law 
of a global community of persons.  This will involve many theoretical and doctrinal tasks.  
At their core, these new tasks involve a global system for safeguarding and delivering 
what can be called the “global basic package,” a basic bundle of political social and 
economic rights everyone is entitled to as a function of their humanity, and which is 
safeguarded and delivered, at the primary level, by the global.  This list can be drawn in a 
variety of ways, but involves at a minimum the following four elements: security, 
subsistence, liberty, voice. 
 We see the germ of a global basic package today in international human rights 
law, humanitarian aid, and the notion of humanitarian intervention.  International law 
today already recognizes a core commitment to deliver basic rights, subsistence food and 
shelter, and some minimum level of security, as a function of our basic humanity.24 In 
                                                 
23 We can think of global public law as the organization of the macro, the law which sets the structure of 
powers, duties and limits of the macro and its officers, relations of the macro to the midrange (states) and 
the micro (individuals), and the definition of and exercise of powers of the macro for the public good.  
Alternatively, we can think of it as the regulatory system for delivery of global public goods.  PROVIDING 
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS (KAUL, ET AL., EDS. 2003). 
24 These achievements can be seen as representing a high water mark of cosmopolitanism in contemporary 
international law.   
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reality, this often amounts to very little, when it amounts to anything at all: a food 
package, a blue helmet in the vicinity, and an occasional visit by an international human 
rights investigator.25 This is not much, but I would suggest that in this we see the germ of 
a global basic package.   
 What is still missing?  There are two fundamental gaps: the absence of effective 
mechanisms for global wealth transfers at the scale necessary to support the global basic 
package; and the absence of effective political representation or voice at the global 
level.26 How we get there, and in the process go from international law to global public 
law, will require a profound re-examination of core international legal doctrines and 
institutions such as boundaries, sovereignty, legitimacy, citizenship, and the territorial 
control of resources.   
 Let me suggest as an example and a starting point, that we must re-think the role 
of territorial political boundaries.  Territorial boundaries now serve as the frame on which 
we hang various concepts of distributive justice such as citizenship and the territorial 
control of resources, which profoundly influence the life prospects of all affected 
individuals.  By privileging citizens over non-citizens in terms of access to the global 
basic package, the political boundary of citizenship dramatically affects our life prospects 
on the basis of one of the most arbitrary aspects of our natural condition – the place we 
                                                 
25 Indeed, the limited nature of this response has lead commentators such as Jean B. Elshtain to argue that 
in these particulars there is still no equivalent to the state, citing Ahrendt’s point that the only meaningful 
site for citizenship remains the state.  “Theorizing Globalization in a Time of War: Challenges and Agendas 
(panel),” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2, 2004 (on file with 
author).  However, I believed this says more about the limits of current theory and politics, than it does 
about the intrinsic limits of meta-state institutions.  International law is incapable of reaching further 
cosmopolitan goals under a “society of states model,” until it shifts to a model of global community and 
becomes global public law. 
26 Jay Mandle and Louis Ferleger refer to this as the need for institutional mechanisms for compensation 
and control, two fundamental elements of the regulation of global market society.  “Preface: Dimensions of 
Globalization,” 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 8, 16 (2000). 
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are born.  In the words of one commentator, “Citizenship in western liberal democracies 
is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances 
one’s life chances.”27   
 Citizenship thus illustrates how the current “society of states” model of 
international law permits territorial boundaries to function at the global level as one of the 
main obstacles to delivery of  a global basic package.  If global community is possible, 
and emerging, as I have argued, then we have to re-think the discretion given states to use 
boundaries as primary determinants of global justice.28 We need to develop a model for 
the international delivery of the basic package – a concept of effective global citizenship 
if you will – in which the accident of birthplace, or the vagaries of naturalization law, do 
not fundamentally affect each person’s life prospects. 
 In order to do so, global public law needs to tackle distributive issues both 
between and within states.  The “society of states” model put the question of justice 
outside the realm of international law.  Globalization means that the problem of 
inequality is a central problem of global social relations, in the same way it is a central 
problem of justice at the domestic level.29   
 What should the role of the state be in a global public order?  Global community 
demands a new view of this role, in which the state no longer holds a monopoly on the 
                                                 
27 Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” in KYMLICKA, THE RIGHTS OF 
MINORITY CULTURES (1995). 
28 As things stand, there is a pernicious anomaly: free movement of capital but no free movement of 
persons, which could be seen as a deliberate attempt to keep labor costs from equalizing.  A global 
economic space demands something approaching the free movement of persons, subject to some notion of 
carrying capacity or assimilation rate.  The very idea conjures images of unsupportable mass migrations, 
which are not inevitable, nor are they the necessary result of changes in border policies.  The primary 
reason for such shifts would be economic inequality, a subject which poses a central challenge to global 
public law. 
29 See generally FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST 
TRADE (2003) (arguing a central role for inequality in contemporary international economic relations). 
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delivery of basic public goods, but must nevertheless play a central role in such delivery, 
including that of the guarantor of last resort.30 However, this does not mean that global 
institutions must be modeled on domestic institutions: a sort of world state.  Rather, we 
must see that, in normative terms, global institutions must be justifiable according to the 
same principles we apply in domestic political theory, whatever their shape.  Their 
legitimacy can no longer rest entirely on their creation by states along duly authorized 
treaty lines, but will require some increased form of public participation, reflecting 
normative principles of political theory in the same way that domestic institutions must.31  
V Conclusion 
 The absence of global institutions capable of giving everyone both the resources 
reflected in this basic package, and a voice in formulating this basic package, is a 
fundamental gap in the global basic structure as it stands today.  We are indebted to the 
antiglobalization protests for building awareness of this problem,32 and for reminding us 
that the creation of a global market society need not result in a global laissez faire market 
culture. We must recall, however, that the progression towards globalization is not 
inevitable or linear, nor is the achievement of a just globalization.  The task of 
international legal theory, or global legal theory as we now might call it, is to draw upon 
both traditional domestic political theory, and innovative studies of our new global social 
reality, to design the next generation of global institutions and doctrines capable of 
delivering global justice for a global community. 
 
30 Indeed, Manuel Castells has argued that globalization is bringing about a new form of nation-state, the 
“network state,” whose principle duty is to successfully manage on our behalf this web of networks.  THE 
POWER OF IDENTITY 242-273 (1997).   
31 See LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989). 
32 GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY 23 (A.E. HOPKINS ED. 2002) (though under-theorized, 
antiglobalization protests maintain public awareness of the inadequacies of under-regulated capitalism and 
the range of values affected by market-driven globalization). 
